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THE RIGHT TO "APPROPRIATE" TRADE VALUES
JAMES A. RAHL*
Few doctrines of the common law concerning competition have
aroused such high hopes and great fears as the so-called doctrine
of "misappropriation of trade values." When the Supreme Court in
1918 approved on grounds of unfair competition the enjoining of
International News Service from copying and transmitting to its cus-
tomers published news reports originated by Associated Press,1 a
spirited controversy began among judges and writers which has not
subsided. The doctrine has scored few actual successes in decisions,
but it has achieved great fame. A powerful lure to plaintiffs' counsel
in all manner of alleged unfair competition situations, the doctrine has
been urged so often that the unfair competition part of the INS opinion
has been cited in over 150 judicial opinions to date. The Supreme
Court's label, "misappropriation,"2 rightly or wrongly, has become
the accepted title for chapter headings and law review articles.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance in research for this article of Mrs. Eleanor S. Weiner, Class of 1962,
Northwestern University, School of Law.
1 International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
2 The Court stated that defendant, in copying the news produced by Associated
Press from early editions of Eastern newspapers and from bulletin boards, and in
"selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing
of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to
itself the harvest of those who have sown." (248 U.S. at 239-40). This, said the Court,
"amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to
divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have
not. .. ." This is "unfair competition in business," and the underlying principle is that
he who has paid the price should have the beneficial use of property. To the contention
that the news was too "fugitive or evanescent" to be property, the Court said that
while this might be an answer in a common law action, it was not in equity, where it
could be considered as having "all the attributes of property necessary for determining
that a misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair competition because contrary
to good conscience." (Id. at 240). The Court elsewhere called it "quasi-property."
(Id. at 236, 242).
The Court rejected the contention that the news was abandoned to the public
when published in the first newspaper. This theory, "by permitting indiscriminate pub-
lication by anybody and everybody for purposes of profit in competition with the
news-gatherer, . . . would render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in
effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the
return." (Id. at 241).
Rejecting the argument that relief in unfair competition cases is limited to palming
off cases, the Court said that this case was one in which defendant's conduct "substitutes
misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation." (Id. at 242).
The Court upheld an injunction against "bodily taking of the words or substance
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The writings have kept the profession well informed, and it
would be quite reasonable to ask what possible excuse there can be
for still another article. The chief justification is that most of the
writings have expounded polar points of view and there may have
been a tendency to lose sight both of the modest function which the
doctrine can perform on a limited basis, and the utter impossibility
of having any general principle against appropriation of published
trade values. This article is an attempt to put these matters in
perspective, and to state a rationale for the doctrine as limited.
The general conclusions may be summarized briefly at the outset.
The courts have thoroughly rejected any broad principle of unfair
competition based on the mere adoption, copying, imitation or use
of trade values which have successfully reached the market. In gen-
eral, there is no question that there is a clear right to "appropriate"
trade values after they have been marketed. Moreover, this right is
important to our economic society, and, contrary to many imprecations
against it, it is probably as morally strong as it is economically sound.
On the other hand, the courts have been willing to interfere with
the appropriation of marketed trade values in certain rather extreme
instances. It is difficult, however, to state a rationale for such cases
and it is easy to be pushed into adopting a radical position either for
or against them. Both Justice Pitney speaking for the majority in the
INS case and Justice Brandeis in the dissent succumbed to the temp-
tation,3 but, of course, they did not have the benefit of years of ex-
perience with the problem.
A rationAle is available. Most of the cases in which relief has
been granted have involved certain types of services of a fragile
character, rather than products, whose commercial exploitation without
destruction by immediate imitation is difficult. The situation has
usually been that the defendant, by copying or imitating the service,
was not merely competing, but was doing so under circumstances
where the result would be to destroy either the value created by
of complainant's news until its commercial value as news" was past. (Id. at 232). It
did not approve any permanent monopoly of the news or right to prevent the public
from copying it. It upheld utilizing "tips" obtained from a competitor's news, as
distinguished from "bodily appropriation." (Id. at 243).
The "misappropriation" label was used again by the Supreme Court in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 at 532 (1935), where the Court stated
that the doctrine of unfair competition has been extended "to apply to misappropriation
as well as misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own, to misap-
propriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor." The only authority given for
this broad dictum was INS v. AP.
3 International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, at 229,
248 (1918).
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plaintiff or the market for it. The protection granted has been to safe-
guard the plaintiff's opportunity to market his trade value. On
this rationale, most of the decisions are acceptable, and perform a
valid function.
THE DIFFICULTY OF CHOOSING A RULE
As Walter Wheeler Cook, who argued against the majority's
adopting a "new rule," reminded Justice Brandeis, a decision in a
case such as INS could not be reached without adopting some new
rule." The problem had never been squarely faced. A decision against
the plaintiff would be a rule that he had "no-right" (Hohfeldian)
and that the defendant and others similarly situated had a right or
privilege to use and profit from the fruits of plaintiff's ideas, skill,
labor and costs, as long as they could do so without transgressing
some special prohibition.
Every case of this kind is troublesome. A recent one illustrates
the uneasy task of the courts. In Intermountain Broadcasting &
Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc.,5 the Idaho Federal Dis-
trict Court was required to determine whether the defendants were
privileged to operate a community television receiving antenna service.
The antenna was located so as to pick up telecasts by the three plain-
tiff television stations, located in Salt Lake City, and to transmit
their programs by microwave relay and cable to the home receiving
sets of customers in Twin Falls, Idaho, who were too far away
(200 air miles) to receive a dependable direct signal from the Salt
Lake stations. The stations each had valuable contracts with a Twin
Falls television station to permit the latter to pick up and rebroadcast
their network programs over its facilities. The regulatory scheme of
the Federal Communications Act did not control the controversy.
Plaintiffs did not attempt to rely upon any theory of statutory copy-
right, and a possible theory of common law copyright protection for
program content was treated by them as subsidiary. The main reliance
was upon the INS principle that defendant's conduct was a "Mis-
appropriation of the fruits of plaintiffs' money, skill and labor." 6
The analogy to the facts of the INS case was fairly good. In
both cases, intangible material of current interest (news and programs)
was produced for profit at great cost and labor, and was being adopted
for sale by defendant at the very moment of its appearance. The effect
4 W.W.C. [Walter Wheeler Cook], Comment, "The Associated Press Case," 28 Yale
LJ. 387 (1919). Actually, Cook called Brandeis' view on this point an "illusion." (Id. at
391).
5 196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho, 1961).
6 Id. at 321.
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was not merely to offer competition to plaintiff, but to tend to destroy
a market which plaintiff was creating and seeking to exploit. In
the INS case, as the Supreme Court recognized, the member-sub-
scribers of Associated Press would presumably not long support at
high cost a news service whose work was being handed over free
to their competitors. Likewise, it was alleged (quite plausibly) in the
Intermountain case that defendant's plan would completely destroy
plaintiffs' market for the sale of rebroadcast privileges in the area
concerned.
7
The Intermountain case was in some ways stronger than the
INS case because the taking would be instantaneous, thereby
making the destruction of the particular business opportunity of plain-
tiff complete. On the other hand, the defendant's conduct in the Inter-
mountain case did not threaten the main business life of the television
stations, as did the conduct of INS. The opportunity of the television
stations to obtain their normal return from sponsors through general
broadcasts was unaffected. It was only the possibility of extra returns
from the extension of regular broadcasts which was in issue.
FOR OR AGAINST INS v. AP
The Intermountain case could have been decided by pivoting
it on a flat adoption or rejection of the misappropriation theory. The
court could have declared, as did Judge Greenberg in New York in
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner,' that efforts to "profit from
the labor, skill, expenditures, name and reputation of others" con-
stitute unfair competition. On the other hand, the court could have
joined forces with Learned Hand to relegate the INS theory to the
graveyard of cases confined to their peculiar facts, believing any
broader view "incredible." 9 The INS case could have been called a
"leading authority" as it was called by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the Waring case,' ° or it could have been said with Judge
Wyzanski that the case would probably be decided differently by the
present Supreme Court, and that it is not unfair competition in Massa-
chusetts to use information assembled by a competitor except in cases
of breach of trust or contract."
If the case were decided on the theory that one must not reap
where he has not sown, or that free rides by competitors constitute
7 Id. at 326.
8 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner, 199 Misc. 794, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 492
(1950); aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 795 (1951).
9 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940); Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
10 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
11 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp.
198, 203-204 (D. Mass. 1942).
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unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs in the Intermountain case should have
won, for the defendants were planning to reap rewards from the free
use of costly television transmissions. Let them pay for a contract
with plaintiffs or go to the trouble of establishing their own tele-
vision station. A rich legal vocabulary with great emotional force is
available to drive the point home including such words as "pirate"
and "parasite."
Moreover, the serious judgment of scholars can be marshalled to
support a holding for plaintiffs. "In general," Dr. Callmann once
said, "the public will not be benefited by allowing one competitor to
profit from the fruits of another's labor." This "is particularly
so when one competitor enriches himself at the expense of the
other." The INS case, he said, "imported into the law of unfair
competition the concept of unjust enrichment."' 2 Edward S. Rogers
called the INS decision one needed to keep pace with modern trade
conditions. "It approaches," he said, "the question from the point of
view of defendants' wrong, rather than a discussion of complainant's
rights. The defendant's conduct was parasitic and immoral. Immoral
conduct is always unfair to someone." 3 Leon Green very recently
has found the INS case analogous to the converting of physical prop-
erty or tapping a power line. "[A]ppropriation of the trade values
of one trader by another" is unfair when it takes such a form, and
competition is no defense. Indeed, he said, there "is no superior
interest which will justify plain, naked appropriation of a competitor's
creation.' 1
4
On the other hand, outright disavowal of the whole idea would
meet with the approval of an equal number of writers. Commenting
contemporaneously, Albert Kocourek applied his jurisprudential talents
to the INS case and concluded that there was no way of stating its
principle, however narrowly, which would be acceptable in our society.
It would be "destructive of all progress" to act upon it, he said,
12 Callmann, "He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in
the Law of Unfair Competition," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 597-599 (1942); cf., Callmann,
"What Is Unfair Competition?" 28 Geo L. J. 585 (1940). See 2 Callmann, The Law
of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks Ch. 15 (2d ed. 1950), where a measured view
of the case law leads to the conclusion that "most courts have yet to extend the law of
unfair competition to prevent unjust enrichment." But see, Sell, "The Doctrine of
Misappropriation in Unfair Competition: The Associated Press Doctrine After Forty
Years," 11 Vand. L. Rev. 483 (1958); Galbally, "Unfair Trade in the Simulation of
Rival Goods-The Test of Commercial Necessity," 3 Villanova L. Rev. 333 (1958).
13 Rogers, "Unfair Competition," 17 Mich. L. Rev. 490, 494 (1919). See Note,
"The Case for Unfair Competition," 29 Notre Dame Lawyer 456 (1954).
14 Green, "Protection of Trade Relations under Tort Law," 47 Va. L. Rev. 559,
566-69 (1961); see also Green, "Relational Interests," 29 Ill. L. Rev. 460 (1934).
[Vol. 23
1962] RIGHT TO "APPROPRIATE" TRADE VALUES 61
because the world as now constituted "must continue on a basis of
mitigated piracy."'" In a similar vein, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., pointed
out that "Columbus discovered America, but here we are"; that
progress depends upon development of the ideas of others; that the
patent and copyright laws determine what original ideas shall be
protected; and that the courts should not do anything different. 6
Milton Handier sounded the antitrust warning, often stated by others,
that "For one to reap with impunity the fruits of another's labor
may be reprehensible, but the creation of new species of property
interests and new series of monopolies by the courts may be disastrous
to free enterprise."' 7
AN INTERMIEDIATE VIEW-PROTECTION OF PRIlMARY MARKETING
PuRPosE
In the Intermountain case, Judge Sweigert denied a motion by
plaintiff for summary judgment. 8 The court obviously was tempted
to repudiate the INS principle, and the opinion shows the continuing
influence of the Brandeis dissent. But while holding against the plain-
tiffs, it refrained from entire rejection of the misappropriation idea, and
offered a special synthesis which leaves some room for relief in a
limited class of cases and which merits attention for its possible value
in harmonizing the conflicting decisions and points of view. The
court stated:
Those courts which have followed and applied the doctrine of In-
ternational News Service have done so in identical fact situations,
. . . or in cases where there was manifest unjust enrichment, for
example, where rights in private enterprises or events for which
the investor had granted exclusive TV or Radio licenses were in-
volved-unique situations in which the primary purpose of an in-
vestor to charge the public for the privilege of watching an event,
would be frustrated or defeated through exhibition by others than
itself or its exclusive licensee .... 19
While the phrase "manifest unjust enrichment" is also manifestly
insufficient as a guide, the example given is useful. Relief was granted
1' A.K. [Albert Kocourek], Comment, 13 Ill. L. Rev. 708, 716-19 (1919).
16 Chafee, "Unfair Competition," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1318 (1940); see Chafee,
"New Ideas about Law," 6 Ind. L. J. 503 (1934).
17 Handier, "Unfair Competition," 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 189 (1936). See also,
Zlinkoff, "Monopoly versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust,
Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition Suits," 53 Yale L. J. 514, 546 (1944); Brown,
"Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols," 57 Yale
L.J. 1165, 1199 (1948).
's Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196
F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961).
19 196 F. Supp. at 323.
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where "the primary purpose.. . to charge the public for the privilege
of watching an event would be frustrated or defeated" by defendant.
In INS, according to Judge Sweigert, the defendant was interfering
with the "primary purpose of Associated Press and its members in the
sale of its gathered news, first or fresh, to the paying public, while
in the pending cases the practice of defendants does not interfere with
any such primary purpose of plaintiff's. 20 Indeed, the court pointed
out that the primary purpose of obtaining revenues from sponsors
might be aided by the defendants. The court also offered other dis-
tinctions from the INS case,21 but lack of need for protection against
frustration of the primary marketing purpose was the primary basis of
the decision.
There are two key elements in this formula: (1) frustration or
destruction, and (2) frustration or destruction of a primary means
whereby plaintiff seeks to reap the profit for his labors. The first
element must be taken rather literally in order to distinguish from
the great mass of "appropriation" situations. It is rare that com-
petitive copying or imitation of a trader's product or service will
substantially destroy his opportunity to market the trade value. What
usually happens is a mere ordinary consequence of competition, i.e.,
a forced sharing of the market with competitors. The plaintiffs in the
Intermountain case met the destruction test, with the allegation that
defendants' plan for a free television ride would destroy the market
for sale of rebroadcast rights; they did not merely allege that the
plan would cut into the rebroadcast market.
The court held against plaintiffs on the second test, holding that
plaintiffs were in no danger of losing a "primary" market. What
different circumstances would satisfy this test? The court said that
there might be recovery if plaintiffs showed disruption of an important
exclusive contract, as in the sports broadcasting cases. But plaintiffs
did have contracts with the Twin Falls station, and they were pre-
sumably exclusive in effect, if not in terms. Further, an exclusive con-
tract is not necessarily a "primary" market; it could be a very minor
aspect of the business. Moreover, a contract need not be exclusive
20 Id. at 325.
21 The court further distinguished the case from INS. v. AP on the ground that
in the Intermountain case, plaintiffs and defendants were not engaged in the same kind
of business, that there was no misrepresentation such as that involved in INS's failure
to acknowledge that AP was the source of the news, (which was the theory of Holmes'
concurring opinion), and that the "modus operandi" and "time factor" of defendants'
use of the broadcasts differed from the INS situation (196 F. Supp. 315, 325-326).
The court also preferred a "cautious approach" because the field of broadcasting is one
over which "Congress has already assumed control sufficient to enable it, if it so chooses,
to regulate the practice one way or another in the public interest." (Id. at 323).
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to be of great value under certain circumstances. Consequently, the
court's example is unclear. The court probably meant that if the
production of the fruits of plaintiffs' labors were planned pursuant to
a profitable contract with another who is paying for exclusive copying
privileges, unauthorized copying would tend to defeat the contract and
the production itself. This is another way of saying that the court's
protection will be reserved for situations in which defendant's conduct
threatens to destroy the opportunity to market the trade value, the
prospect of which has induced plaintiff to bring it forth. In the
Intermountain case, the plaintiffs engaged in broadcasting for reasons
completely independent of any desire to profit from selling rebroadcast
rights. The latter prospect was incidental, and, therefore, defendants'
conduct would not interfere with production of the values concerned.
Thus understood, the court's formula is a practical one. It incurs
little or no cost in the reduction of competition, because it protects
the marketing of trade values in circumstances where marketing would
otherwise be discouraged, and it denies protection where the trade
values will be produced anyway. It is somewhat analogous, as
Leon Green has pointed out,22 to protection against conversion, and
it is also similar to the traditional line of cases wherein relief is given
against intentional physical interferences which prevent the marketing
of goods.23
Further, although it is not a simple test, its customary use would
be in cases where equitable relief is sought, and it should be no more
difficult a formula than others administered by equity courts, as
Walter Wheeler Cook pointed out long ago.24 And perhaps Albert
Kocourek could approve it as a principle,25 since it is sufficiently
narrow in application that it ought not to interfere with progress and
may promote it.
THE DECISIONS FOR PLAINTIFFS IN LIGHT OF THE FRUSTRATION
OF PRIIIARY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Most cases in which protection has been granted on a misappro-
priation theory meet the tests suggested.26 Some cases have arisen
22 Green, "Protection of Trade Relations under Tort Law," 47 Va. L. Rev. 559,
566 (1961).
23 For cases, see Green, Malone, Pedrick and Rahl, Injuries to Relations (1959) 4;
Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practices Ch. 12 (1950).
24 Walter Wheeler Cook, "The Associated Press Case," 28 Yale L. J. 387 (1919).
Cook was critical of the intimation that the courts were incapable of moulding the
legal situation so as to safeguard against abuses without going too far.
25 Supra note 15.
26 For valuable collections of cases and commentaries, see Handler, Trade Regula-
tion Ch. 11 (3d ed. 1960); Kaplan and Brown, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competi-
1962]
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which were very similar to the facts in the INS situation, and these
have resulted in relief against commercial copying of news reports
and the use thereof in competition with plaintiff."' Denial of such
protection has been rare.2 s
Another class of cases involves the unauthorized broadcasting or
rebroadcast of events with the production of which plaintiff is con-
nected and for which he seeks profit through broadcasting or sale
of broadcasting rights.2 9 In Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc.
v. Transradio Press Service, Inc., ° the court enjoined defendant from
providing a contemporaneous account of a prize fight to radio station
customers, where the source of the information was to be the broadcast,
authorized by plaintiff, through a profitable contract with a network.
Denial of relief presumably would have endangered the contract, and
would have reduced or eliminated plaintiff's incentive to allow broad-
casting. In Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.,3
the court enjoined the broadcasting of professional baseball games
through observation from vantage points outside the enclosed ball
park, plaintiff having sold the broadcasting rights to another station.
In Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp.,32 the court
enjoined the direct rebroadcast through defendant's channel of plain-
tiff's broadcasts of World Series baseball games. In National Ex-
tion and other Topics 494, 508, 540-614 (1960); Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practice
Ch. 4 (1950); Green, Malone, Pedrick and RabI, Relational Interests 127-168 (1959); 2
Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks Ch. 15 (2d ed. 1950); Nims, Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks Ch. 19 (4th ed. 1947); Note, "Misappropriation as
Unfair Competition," 6 Syr. L. Rev. 317 (1955), and the articles cited in notes 12-17,
inclusive, supra.
27 Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc,, 9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Wash. 1934), reading
plaintiff's news over radio; Veatch v. Wagner, 109 F. Supp. 537 (D. Alaska 1953),
similar; McCord v. Plotnick, 108 Cal. App. 2d 393, 239 P.2d 32 (1951), competitive
copying of credit newspaper.
28 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp.
198 (D. Mass. 1942), where the court, applying Massachusetts law, rejected a con-
tention that it was unfair competition for a newspaper to copy racing information
collected and published by plaintiff; the opinion included an express refusal to follow
the INS decision.
20 See Solinger, "Unauthorized Use of Television Broadcasts," 48 Col. L. Rev. 848
(1948); Nizer, "Proprietary Interest in Radio Programs," 38 Col. L. Rev. 538 (1938);
Comment, "Unfair Competition and Exclusive Broadcasts of Sporting Events," 48 Yale
L.J. 288 (1938).
30 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (1937).
31 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Penn. 1938); see also Southwestern Broadcasting Co. v.
Oil Center Broadcasting Co., 210 S.W. 2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), telephone line
into high school game.
32 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941).
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hibition Co. v. Fass,3 3 the adaptation and transmittal by teletype of
sports broadcasts was enjoined. The decision in Loeb v. Turner,
34
where the court refused relief against a rebroadcast of a sporting
event, is consistent with these cases in that the rebroadcast was solely
to an area beyond reach of plaintiff's station; the case is thus
analogous to the Intermountain decision in this respect.
Probably in the same category as the broadcast cases are decisions
preventing the unauthorized taking or use of commercial pictures of
professional sporting events where sale of picture rights would be an
expected source of profit.35
While there were several grounds for the holding in Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n v. Wagner,3" one rationale was that defendant's tran-
scribing of radio broadcasts of opera performances and the subsequent
sale of recordings of the broadcasts was unfair competiton. The plain-
tiff opera association had a valuable contract with the plaintiff record
company for recording rights, and defendant's conduct threatened
destruction of the value of this contract thereby undermining both
the incentive to broadcast the programs and the incentive to pay for
recording rights. In this light, the conclusion of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in the earlier case of RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman37
is quite reconcilable. In that case, the court, by Judge Learned Hand,
denied an injunction against the commercial broadcasting of musical
records produced and sold by plaintiffs for home use. While Judge
Hand thought it desirable to confine the INS case to its peculiar
facts, and virtually to repudiate the whole doctrine, this approach was
unnecessary. RCA and Whiteman were successfully marketing their
records. They were merely seeking, in a more extreme manner than
that of the plaintiffs in the Intermountain case, to "have their cake and
eat it too" by obtaining added profits from restrictions in use of the
records after profitable sales. Such protection was unnecessary. Judge
Hand's objections to the Pennsylvania decision in the Waring case,
which allowed relief on facts similar to the RCA case,3 however, were
for these reasons completely sound.
33 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
34 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
35 In Rudolph Mayer-Pictures v. Pathe News, 255 N.Y.S. 1016 (1932), the taking
of motion pictures of a boxing match in Ebbetts Field from a nearby building was
enjoined; cf. Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 7 N.Y.S.2d
845 (1938), enjoining use in a sports movie of certain actual shots of plaintiff's hockey
team.
36 199 Misc. 794, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1951).
37 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
38 In Waring v. XVDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937),
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There have been very few decisions for plaintiffs in other types
of cases except where factors other than mere "appropriation" were
invloved.39  Relief has been largely confined to cases involving news,
broadcasting, performances, and related activities. 0 These activities
have the common characteristic that destruction of their value is
relatively simple because they must be produced and distributed under
circumstances where appropriation at the initial stage may frustrate
the opportunity to market them. Judicial protection is extended in
order to get them to market on a par with products and services having
less fragile marketing characteristics. But judicial protection ceases
the court followed INS in enjoining the commercial broadcasting of records produced
by plaintiff and sold with notice restricting the subsequent use to non-commercial
purposes. The protection granted was not necessary to protect plaintiff's opportunity
to sell records. Cf., Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. N.C. 1939). Similarly,
to the extent that the decision in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) rests upon a misappropriation theory, it is not consistent with
the rationale suggested in this article because there also the protection granted was
against duplication of recordings which had been or were being sold. It is interesting
to note that the court regarded the Metropolitan Opera case as being in point because
some of the records being sold by defendant in that case were of performances as to
which one plaintiff, Columbia Records, had sold records. Cf., Note, "Nonpatentable
and Noncopyrightable Trade Values; Private Rights and the Public Interest," 59 Col.
L. Rev. 902, 913 (1959), where the Capitol Records case is interpreted as one where
publication had not taken place. See Kaplan, "Performer's Right and Copyright: The
Capitol Records Case," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 185 (1956).
39 Other cases frequently mentioned as involving reliance upon the "misappropri-
ation" doctrine include : Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d
386 (1959), noted, 25 Albany L. Rev. 167 (1961), where Glenn Miller's widow recovered
for unauthorized sale of records based on the sound track of an authorized movie; in-
terference with a recording contract with RCA was a factor in the decision. Cf. Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1955), recovery for
unauthorized televising of an old fight movie. Uproar Co. v. Natl Broadcasting Co.,
81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936), where the court enjoined Ed Wynn and publishing
company from printing and selling cheap pamphlets of the scripts of Ed Wynn's broad-
casts produced for plaintiff; impairment of the value of Wynn's contract with plaintiff
was a major factor, along with possible confusion as to and disparagement of the
sponsorship. National Telephone Directory Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 214 Mo. App. 683,
263 S.W. 483 (1921), enjoining placing of advertising covers on plaintiff's directories in
a hotel; the court treated this as acutal appropriation of plaintiff's tangible personal
property in the phone books. Contra, New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. National
Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 141 N.E.2d 702 (1957), sale of plastic advertising
covers for directories permitted. Meyer v. Horowitz, 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925),
10 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1926), enjoining sale of postcards by defendant for use in
vending machines designed for plaintiff's cards; the case cannot easily be reconciled
with the rationale of this article, nor with the present policy of the antitrust laws
against tying restrictions.
40 Note, "Misappropriation as Unfair Competition," 6 Syr. L. Rev. 317 (1955).
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when the market is reached, and the plaintiff is given a real chance to
sell his trade value.
THE DECISIONS FOR DEFENDANTS IN LIGHT OF THE FRUSTRATION
OF PRImARY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
The great bulk of the cases in which plaintiffs have sought pro-
tection against the copying or imitation of published trade values have
resulted in decisions for the defendants. This is as it should be under
the suggested doctrine, because in these cases relief has not been neces-
sary to protect the primary opportunity to market a product or
service. The plaintiff can reach the market without judicial help, and
is merely complaining about competition.
The largest class of such cases is that involving imitation of goods
and machines. Relief in these cases is often sought and customarily
denied. Complaints have been refused for copying or imitating such
widely different things as steak knives,4 chocolate Christmas greeting
cards,42 baseball "trading" cards,43 fabric and apparel designs,44 elec-
trical parts, 45 drugs,46 chinaware,47 "pocket" books,48 garment closure
devices,49 and business forms.0  Many more examples could be pro-
vided.Y1
While it often seems, as Judge Medina stated in American Safety
41 Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Co., 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952).
42 Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
43 Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y.
1952).
44 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929); Millinery Cre-
ators Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1940). United Merchants and Manufacturers,
Inc., v. Bromley Fabrics, Inc., 3 Misc. 2d 179, 148 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1955). Cf., Dior v.
Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1956), where injunction was issued because
defendants copied designs at private showings. In Richard J. Cole, Inc. v. Manhattan
Modes Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1956), it was held on the facts that publica-
tion had occurred. In general, see writings cited in note 26 supra, and Weikart, Design
Piracy, 19 Ind. LJ. 235 (1944); Casser, "Legal Protection of Commercial Design," 1959
Wis. L. Rev. 652; Elman, "The Limits of State Jurisdiction in Affording Common Law
Protection to Clothing Designs," 11 Vand. L. Rev. 501 (1958).
45 Harvey Hubbell, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 262 Fed. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
46 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), re-
fusal to enjoin imitation of pink color of stomach disorder remedy in absence of showing
of secondary meaning. Upjohn v. Merrell, 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920), same decision,
same color.
47 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
48 Pocket Books, Inc. v. Meyers, 292 N.Y. 64, 54 N.E.2d 6 (1944).
49 Raenore Novelties, Inc. v. Superb Stitching Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1944).
50 Reynolds & Reynolds v. Novick, 114 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1940).
51 See Handier, Cases on Trade Regulation Ch. 11, esp. 971, note 13 (3d ed. 1960).
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Table Co. v. Schreiber,5" that courts "have little sympathy for a
wilful imitator," they have been outstandingly successful in overcoming
their lack of sympathy. Product imitation, once the product has been
placed on the market, is plainly unactionable, regardless of how great
an innovation the plaintiff's product represents (absent patent pro-
tection, of course), and regardless of how seriously defendant may be
diverting sales (absent confusion of source, passing off or other inde-
pendent wrong). This is as true in New York, which has been
especially hospitable to the misappropriation doctrine, as it is else-
where. A different rule would have deprived the public of any alter-
natives in automobiles, ice cream cones, rubber tires and skyscrapers.
These cases demonstrate the impossibility of having any general
doctrine against appropriation of trade values. It is the product cases
of which one usually thinks when he is in a mood to reject the INS
case and all its works. It is also easy to forget, however, that not all
valuable things get to market as easily as tangible products.
Largely the same lack of protection has been accorded to
valuable business ideas, methods, and systems. In the field of business
ideas, it is clear that once an idea has been unconditionally communi-
cated in private, or generally published, there is no protection against
its adoption however novel, concrete, and valuable it may be.53 More-
over, the courts have denied protection against the copying and sale
of parts for unpatented business systems, such as plates for use in the
"Addressograph" system,54 replacement watch crystals for sale in a
special cabinet designed for plaintiff's crystals,55 and use of plaintiff's
"Charga-Plate" credit plates in defendant's stores.56 It goes without
saying that more general business systems and methods are without
judicial protection against imitation. A different rule might have pre-
52 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959), allowing injunction against copying of plantiff's
collar-making machine after patent expired, because of showing of active confusion of
source. Judge Medina stated, however, that absent some independent wrong, "imita-
tion is the life blood of competition," ibid. Cf., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v.
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955); see dissent
by Clark, J. on ground that decision in effect extended life of the patent.
53 Havighurst, "The Right to Compensation for an Idea," 49 Nw. U. L. Rev.
295, 301 (1954). See, e.g., Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir.
1936), denying protection against copying of "Bank Night" plan; Continental Casualty
Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), no relief for "pirating" plan for
insuring against loss of corporate stock certificate.
64 Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941).
65 Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc., 283 N.Y. 1, 27
N.E.2d 212 (1940).
56 Hartford Charga-Plate Assoc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores, 215 F.2d
668 (2d Cir. 1954).
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vented copying such ingenious methods as the supermarket, the drive-
in bank, and the loose-leaf law service. 57
Similarly, uncopyrighted advertising material is open to appro-
priation." Since advertising is closely related to trademarks and
tradenames, however, and since unique advertising methods or slogans
often identify a particular business firm, it is not uncommon for
confusion of source to result from appropriation of such material,
in which case the courts will act on plaintiff's behalf.
Other values which have been denied protection have included
such things as a magic act,59 the typography of a book, 0 uncopy-
righted musical annotations,"' photographs,62 comic strip characters,
63
and song arrangements.
64
FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO APPROPRIATE
The right to appropriate published trade values, subject to the
qualifications discussed above, rests upon firm foundations. Its legal
foundation has been shown in the decisions. It remains to mention its
moral and economic foundations.
Much confusion of thought has resulted from careless talk about
the reprehensibleness of reaping where one has not sown, of taking a
free ride, and of imitating. There is hardly any excuse in the dis-
cussion of a difficult subject such as this for the use of emotional
words like "pirate" and "parasite." But even more to the point, the
word "misappropriation" is itself inaccurate and misleading. In
57 Cf. J. Irizarry Y Puente v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 248 F.2d
799 (1st Cir. 1957).
56 See Brown, "Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols," 57 Yale L. J. 1165 (1948).
59 Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 813, 16 So. 2d 53 (1943). But cf., Chaplin v.
Amador, 269 Pac. 544 (Cal. App. 1928), granting recovery against movies with an actor
named "Charlie Aplin" because of likelihood of deception of the public; Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Santa's Workshop v. Sterling, 122
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953), deceptively similar unique place of business. See, Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), parody of copyrighted play.
60 Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
61 Descles & Cie S.A. v. Nemmers, 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961), no recovery
for photocopying of 90% of uncopyrighted annotations of liturgical music.
62 Hesse v. Brunner, 172 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), photographs of Biblical
scenes.
63 National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), "Superman" v. "Captain Marvel." Cf., Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132
N.E. 133 (1921), injunction against imitation of "Mutt & Jeff" on ground of likelihood
of deception of public. See Note, "The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Char-
acters through Trade-Mark, Unfair Competition, and Copyright," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 349
(1954).
64 Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Calif. 1950).
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its customary usage, to misappropriate is wrongfully to take some-
thing from another. The word signifies that the defendant has not
only used something belonging to the plaintiff, but has also deprived
the plaintiff of its use. The torts of fraud and conversion involve
true misappropriation. But in most of the cases under consideration,
the plaintiff does not complain of being deprived of possession of his
trade value or of the right to use it; but, the usual complaint alleges
loss of exclusive possession, enjoyment, and use. A right to exclude
others is asserted. This claim is substantially like that made in suits
for patent infringement, i.e., the plaintiff claims transgression of a
monopoly right. If a plaintiff is forced to state it in that manner, and
is not permitted to talk about "appropriation," two important changes
occur. First, his burden greatly increases because our attitude toward
common law extension of monopoly privileges is far less sympathetic
than our attitude toward protection of property against misappro-
priation. The deception involved in the use of words like "property"
and "quasi-property" to describe plaintiff's rights in cases like this
becomes clear. Second, the defendant's standing is greatly improved
if he is regarded as one who is competing (i.e., interfering with monop-
oly), rather than one who is appropriating (i.e., doing something akin to
stealing). The decisions for and against plaintiffs discussed above
show actual recognition of the difference between something like true
appropriation ("frustration of primary marketing purpose") and
mere competition.
Although many of the supposed moral problems disappear with a
few changes in words, there still remains a tendency to think that
copying is wrong in itself. It is wrong in school examinations designed
to test individual accomplishment. It is wrong when it takes the form
of plagiarism of literary, artistic, and musical work, although this
wrong is in the failure to give credit rather than in the copying itself.
Is copying of commercial values wrong in a moral sense?
In most of the important fields of human activity it is not usually
considered wrong to imitate valuable things, ideas and methods. The
more acceptable to society the thing is, the more others are encouraged
to imitate it. Education is founded upon this premise, as is progress
in science, art, literature, music, and government. Indeed, where
most human values are concerned, the tendency of our society and
much of our law is to disapprove of a failure to imitate, which we
call "anti-social" or "non-conformity," and to reward the imitator,
or "conformist."
This is true in economic matters. We condemn communism, and
we seek to induce others to imitate free enterprise. In day-to-day
affairs, Men of business regard highly other businessmen whose
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methods conform to custom, and disapprove of those who depart too
radically from the norm. It is the price cutter, not the price con-
formist, who is regarded as "unethical." It is the seller who deviates
from normal channels or patterns of distribution who usually earns
the disapprobation.
Furthermore, looking at the facts, there is little basis for saying
that our economic society regards as immoral the imitation of specific
trade values even when they have immediate pecuniary worth to
their originator. The uniform and frequent refusal of the courts to
protect against such imitation except in value-destruction cases is
persuasive. Further proof arises from the fact that the Federal Trade
Commission, which has dealt with thousands of unfair competition
cases under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act over the
past half century and has evolved numerous rules on the subject, has
not developed any general principle against "misappropriation."
We have but to look around us to see that our "dynamic" econ-
omy is one which thrives upon and requires rapid imitation of in-
novated trade values. Without intending to deprecate the patent and
copyright systems, we can say that the preponderance of the great
advances associated with our economic progress have come forth with
only modest statutory protection, or none at all, and have been freely
and quickly copied, including the great newer institutions of commerce
such as the corporation and the modern credit system; the familiar
systems of transportation and communication; basic methods of pro-
duction such as assembly-line methods and use of automation;
fundamental engineering achievements such as great bridges, roads,
and skyscrapers; countless new and improved products; and most
of the newer forms of marketing and distribution, including chain
stores, cooperatives, department stores, supermarkets, modern stream-
lined wholesale methods, mail order houses, and now shopping centers
and drive-in establishments. Nothing is calculated to restore per-
spective on the importance of the right to appropriate more quickly
than a comparison of these freely-appropriated great commercial
values with the insignificant social and economic worth of most of
the values which have been litigated in the decided cases.
Finally, as often pointed out, we cannot have a general rule
against copying of published trade values and at the same time have
an effective system of competition. 65 Although competition has many
definitions and descriptions, it is clear to all that it cannot exist
without the availability of reasonably close alternatives for the satis-
faction of economic wants. While complete functional interchange-
05 See note 17, supra.
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ability of competing products and services is not always required, and
much non-functional differentiation is tolerable up to a point, it is
obvious that the alternatives must be substantially similar in quality
and price, and must come from independent sources.66
Substantial similarity of alternatives can come about in only one
of two ways-by independent development or by imitation. While
there are many instances of simultaneous independent innovation, our
economy would still be in the Dark Ages if this were the only circum-
stance under which competing alternatives could be offered. Imitation
is inherent in any system of competition and it is imperative for an
economy in which there is rapid technological advance.
It follows that preservation of a high degree of freedom to
copy, imitate, mimic, and "appropriate" the published or marketed
trade values of others is not merely defensible, but is of vital im-
portance, and the courts are to be commended for generally recog-
nizing its importance. What is still needed is that we rid ourselves of
the false sense of guilt shown in our continual apologizing for permit-
ting a freedom which we know is of fundamental importance.
It is not freedom of competition which requires apology. It is
interference with freedom which must always be explained. Accord-
ingly, there is intellectual danger in the use of presumptions of
wrong-doing in the business tort area such as the "prima facie tort"
theory.67 Tort law will be entirely out of balance with social and
economic needs and norms if it purports to require justification for
the mere intentional diversion of custom and patronage. It is the claim
of right to protection from competition, not competition itself, which
should always be put to the test of justification.
66 Professor Edwards has said that a structural characteristic of effective competi-
tion is existence of "an appreciable number of sources of supply and an appreciable
number of potential customers for substantially the same product or service," Edwards,
Maintaining Competition 9 (1949). Freedom of every trader to adopt innovations, he
adds, provides substantial opportunity for experiment and improvement, id. at 9.
Professor Wilcox stated: "Competition among sellers, even though imperfect, may be
regarded as effective or workable if it offers buyers real alternatives sufficient to enable
them, by shifting their purchases from one seller to another, substantially to influence
quality, service and price. Competition, to be effective, need not involve the standard-
ization of commodities; it does, however, require the ready substitution of one prod-
uct for another; it may manifest itself in differences in quality and service as well as
in price," Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, Monograph No. 21
8 (1940); Temp. Nat'l Econ. Comm. (76th 'Cong. 3d Sess.) See also, Report of Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 315, 330 (1955) for rec-
ognition of importance of freedom to imitate innovations.
07 But see, Brown, "The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort
Principle," 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 563 (1959); Green, "Protection of Trade Relations under
Tort Law," 47 Va. L. Rev. 559, 569 (1961).
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The situation is analogous to the rule of reason in antitrust law.
Principles of unfair competition limit freedom of competition and are
thus something like private restraints of trade. However, we do not
condemn restraints of trade unless they are shown to be unreasonable,
i.e., that they unduly lessen competition. With Justice Brandeis, not
in the INS v. AP case, but in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v.
United States, we say
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.6"
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the role for a doctrine against the adoption of
trade values by competitors must be extremely limited. But there
is a valid role, and that is to protect trade values against copying of
a sort which will cause their destruction or their frustration. Thus
confined, such protection will not ordinarily interfere with competition,
and it "perhaps . . . promotes competition." It certainly promotes
competition if the refusal of protection would result in suppression of
the trade value, either by its destruction at the hands of the defendant,
or by its concealment or non-use by the plaintiff.
Such a test is far harder to administer than one which totally
rejects any basis for protection, or one which claims a general principle
against "misappropriation." But plainly neither of these extremes is
acceptable. Competition is not an absolute value by any means. Yet,
we cannot tolerate anything but a very confined rule against the taking
of published trade values.
We will tolerate, and occasionally we do need, the aid of the courts
in escorting the plaintiff to the market with values so fragile that they
cannot otherwise make it.
68 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
